In this article, I would like to identify the main points of the poststructuralist discourse, in which the topic of conscious insanity is actively postulated. The article considers different understandings of consciousness and madness in Western and Russian philosophy, the views of two philosophical schools - Delesian and singular anthropology. The basics of the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari, as well as representatives of modern Russian philosophy, are shown. The schizophrenic of the West is opposed to the blessed fool of the East. The flat (digital) perception of insanity is opposed to the deep perception, as attempts to go beyond the objective, using Kant's a priori apparatus of imagination. The subjectivity of the human is considered as the antithesis of the objectivity of the posthuman. The article clearly traces the apology of conservative, traditionalist views on the problem of consciousness. Continuing the Spinozist approach to dividing the unified field of consciousness into effects and ideas, Deleuze and Guattari propose to split consciousness completely into infinitely discrete flows in the new postmodern reality of rhizomatic connections. It seems obvious that the hermeneutic analysis of the word “consciousness” gives it two important interpretations: on the one hand, consciousness in Western philosophy has a purely rational connotation, on the other, consciousness in the Russian philosophical tradition carries the integrity of its perception without affective-ideological dichotomy.

In this article, I would like to identify the main points of the poststructuralist discourse, in which the topic of conscious insanity is actively postulated. The article considers different understandings of consciousness and madness in Western and Russian philosophy, the views of two philosophical schools - Delesian and singular anthropology. The basics of the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari, as well as representatives of modern Russian philosophy, are shown. The schizophrenic of the West is opposed to the blessed fool of the East. The flat (digital) perception of insanity is opposed to the deep perception, as attempts to go beyond the objective, using Kant's a priori apparatus of imagination. The subjectivity of the human is considered as the antithesis of the objectivity of the posthuman. The article clearly traces the apology of conservative, traditionalist views on the problem of consciousness. Continuing the Spinozist approach to dividing the unified field of consciousness into effects and ideas, Deleuze and Guattari propose to split consciousness completely into infinitely discrete flows in the new postmodern reality of rhizomatic connections. It seems obvious that the hermeneutic analysis of the word “consciousness” gives it two important interpretations: on the one hand, consciousness in Western philosophy has a purely rational connotation, on the other, consciousness in the Russian philosophical tradition carries the integrity of its perception without affective-ideological dichotomy.